Far-right websites published unrealistic data as part of a broader operation to overthrow the Venezuelan government.

On Wednesday, journalists from Mission Truth, an independent organization dedicated to the analysis of international geopolitics, published an extensive study contrasting the narratives of the Venezuelan far right with official data from the July 28 presidential elections issued by the National Electoral Council (CNE). Below is the Mission Truth report.

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At the center of the government change operation in Venezuela, Edmundo Gonzalez’s campaign team, ConVzla, launched two websites that acted as a parallel National Electoral Council (CNE), an action that violated Venezuelan electoral laws and was used to present results not announced by the official electoral body.

The Resultadosconvzla.com website , whose domain was acquired on July 27, is under scrutiny and controversy for hosting supposed electoral “records” held by the opposition. Various analyses have found a set of serious inconsistencies and concluded that more than 80% of these documents were likely modified or are false.

Using this data, ConVzla calculates the election results and publishes them on the Elecciones2024venezuela.com website, another page that claims the authority to publish numbers supposedly showing Edmundo Gonzalez as the winner.

The portal resultadosconvzla.com records just over 9,000 proof documents, which, if real, would represent 30% of the more than 30,000 polling stations that opened on July 28. It is clear that, besides being seriously questioned, these documents do not represent the majority of the tally sheets generated on election day. It is also important to note that, so far, there are no legal or institutional avenues to audit the opposition’s “records.”

The Supreme Justice Court (TSJ), through its Electoral Chamber, conducted an expert review of the July 28 elections. Edmundo Gonzalez was summoned to appear before this body but did not attend. He also did not provide the highest judicial body with the proof documents or “records,” leaving the material that “proves” the opposition’s “victory” outside the review process.

According to the Machado/Gonzalez duo —let’s not forget to mention it— as part of their strategy to provoke a government change in Venezuela based on false electoral results, the candidate from the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) supposedly received 7,303,480 votes (67.08%), while Nicolas Maduro received 3,316,142 (30.46%).

On the other hand, on August 2, with the publication of the second bulletin, CNE President Elvis Amoroso confirmed that Nicolas Maduro was re-elected with 6,408,844 votes (51.9%), while Gonzalez garnered 5,326,104 (43.1%).

This analysis will review both figures, comparing past electoral behaviors, the political dynamics surrounding the election, and the qualitative factors that contribute to the controversy expressed in numbers.

What the Opposition’s Data Seeks to Convey

Eugenio Martinez (@puzkas) shared a comparative chart on his X platform account showing chavista vote trends in elections for representative positions since the 2006 presidential election. The chart shows a pronounced downward trend line that reaches the supposed 3,316,142 votes that Nicolas Maduro allegedly received on July 28, according to the parallel (and therefore illegal) data released by the opposition. The chart in question was created by the NGO Votoscopio, directed by Martinez himself.

All the numbers in the chart, except for those in 2024, are official and provided by the CNE. The elections where Chavism received the most votes were the four presidential elections of 2006, 2012, 2013, and 2018. In other electoral processes, although Chavism maintained a majority percentage, the numbers decreased.

This is a common behavior among voters in general, both chavistas and opposition, who tend to participate in greater numbers in presidential elections. It can be stated that chavista voters place more importance on presidential elections due to the inherent significance of the presidential office to their political project.

The 3,316,142 votes that the opposition attributes to Maduro in 2024 is the only factor that breaks the trend of voting in the Bolivarian Revolution in presidential elections.

According to the CNE, the 2012 presidential elections gave Chavism the most votes, with 8,184,383, while in the 2018 presidential elections, they reached 6,288,430.

The chart precisely illustrates the electoral highs and lows of Chavism in presidential elections, reaffirming that the information offered by the opposition breaks the parameters, making their 2024 figure the lowest not only in presidential elections but in all elections.

The supposed “data” released—illegally, let’s remember—by the Gonzalez/Machado campaign team contrasts with the parameters in several ways. One of these is, as seen in the previous chart, that the CNE data for the 2020 elections shows that Chavism received 4,331,388 votes.

That vote, supposedly higher than in 2024, occurred in the context of an election where overall participation was notably low, as only 30.18% of the Permanent Electoral Register (REP) turned out to vote.

According to the opposition, the July 28 election would be the only one with medium-high participation, according to their data, in which Chavism did not support its candidate, contrary to its tradition. It would even be the election where it performed the worst, even compared to the apathetic 2020 elections. At first glance and with simple reasoning, the figure seems implausible.

It is necessary to pause and point out that in any election, any political force is subject to electoral setbacks. Any force can win or lose overwhelmingly. But the factors behind such a phenomenon lie in the real political denominators of the election’s momentum or context.

An electoral day that would give Chavism such a low level of support—just over 3 million votes, as the opposition claims—would have occurred in a significantly adverse national context or with such a severe negative accumulation that it would imply a deep, widespread, and extended break in the cohesion of chavista forces and their support base. A party could only lose its support base under extraordinary circumstances. The period from 2018 to 2024 does not record shocks of this nature.

In terms of the national context category, it could be said that the 2018-2024 cycle was much less adverse than the 2013-2018 period, given the economic conditions, social indicators, the impact of coercive measures against the Venezuelan economy, and the general level of turmoil in the country.

During the 2020-2024 period, the Venezuelan economy began to grow from the last quarter of 2021. The country achieved institutional stabilization since the 2020 parliamentary elections; the most aggressive mechanisms of the external economic pressure agenda were reduced with the re-establishment of commercial relations with various oil companies; the exchange rate stabilized, hyperinflation was curtailed, and price increases were minimized.

Overall, the variables of the 2020-2024 period do not suggest conditions that would accelerate such an aggressive loss of support as the opposition suggests, according to its “data.” In other words, according to the qualitative parameters of the national context, the data offered by the opposition would have made more sense in the 2018 election.

In graphical form, chavista votes —again, according to Gonzalez/Machado— would have plummeted in presidential elections as follows:

According to the chart, Chavism would have lost more votes in the 2018-2024 period (nearly 3 million) than it lost in the 2013-2018 period (1.2 million votes compared to 2013). This is after taking into account that the 2013-2018 period was much more complex and aggressive in all political, economic, and social indicators.

Maria Corina Machado and other political actors from the extremist wing of the opposition claim—to explain their unverifiable figures—that the Chavista base “rebelled” against Maduro. But this is impossible to determine according to reliable data parameters, given that in Venezuela, voting is secret and there is no public evidence that this occurred in that manner. On the contrary, there are truly objective indicators that show Chavism has strong electoral organizations, which do impact its electoral floor (the minimum base of votes).

There are more than 5 million active militia members who have a strong identification with Chavism. The PSUV party has an organization of 300,000 street and community leaders, in addition to structures at the level of 30,000 electoral centers (UBCHs), parishes, and municipalities. Each of the members of these organizational forms compiled verified 1×10 lists that included party militants and sympathizers of the largest party in the Great Patriotic Pole.

Additionally, there are 100,000 social, communal, party, and movement organizations of various natures, which together form a Chavista support base separate from the PSUV. This is the “electoral machinery” of Chavismo. This suggests that the support base recorded in the electoral organization reaches an estimated more than 6 million people across all these instances of militancy and sympathy.

ConVzla’s narrative, supported by the parallel results portals, suggests that five out of ten people co-opted in the various territorial and sectoral instances of Chavism voted for Edmundo Gonzalez, and the only element they rely on to establish that claim are their unverifiable figures, published outside the election, not subject to the TSJ’s expert review, and seriously questioned, as a large part of their “records” were likely digitally altered.

What the Official CNE Data Says

The National Electoral Council (CNE), with 96.87% of the results transmitted, reported that Nicolas Maduro Moros, the candidate of the Great Patriotic Pole, was re-elected with 6,408,844 votes (51.95%).

Meanwhile, Edmundo Gonzalez received 5,326,104 votes (43.18%). Additionally, the remaining eight opposition candidates collectively garnered almost 5% of the valid votes.

It is necessary to examine these figures and compare the electoral records, as proposed by Eugenio Martinez, according to the different types of elections since 2006.

Based on the historical data recorded by the CNE, it can be said that the vote count that President Maduro would have obtained in the 2024 presidential election falls within the range of chavista performance in presidential elections since 2006.

With over 6.4 million votes, he would have achieved a result slightly higher than the vote count in the challenging year of 2018 when he secured just over 6.288 million. From a qualitative perspective, this result would be supported by two political science variables.

The first is the country’s context during the 2020-2024 cycle, characterized by better overall conditions of political stability, economic recovery, and the stabilization of the critical points in the cross-cutting socioeconomic crisis. Moreover, an electoral result exceeding 6 million votes aligns with the structures mentioned earlier.

In purely organic terms, Chavism has the capacity to secure more than 6 million votes, fitting within the electoral floors and ceilings of its performance in the presidential elections led by Nicolas Maduro, as seen in the following graph.

The previous graph suggests an electoral behavior similar to the overall political dynamics in Venezuela, going through a cycle of deteriorating sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions that led to a considerable loss of support for Maduro (and the opposition) by 2018, establishing a political floor in presidential elections.

However, the gradual economic recovery, institutional stability, and social calm post-2020 also suggest the possibility of a modest but significant recovery in support for Maduro by 2024, placing this election in the middle ground between the 2018 floor and the 2013 ceiling.

On the other hand, the opposition, based on the data provided by the CNE, including those from July 28, has shown a significant recovery compared to the 2018 presidential election. Therefore, the more than 5 million votes obtained in 2024 fall well within its range between its lowest and highest recorded points.

The previous graph indeed gives the opposition a high weighting for 2018, considering the combined total of just over 1.9 million votes obtained by Henri Falcon and just over 1 million votes secured by Javier Bertucci. In that election, the opposition was divided, with the large traditional parties of the opposition spectrum boycotting the process. The more than 5.3 million votes obtained by Edmundo Gonzalez reflect other real dynamics that also occurred in the July 28 election.

For instance, electoral cohesion was lower in this presidential election, as several governors and mayors did not consistently support Gonzalez, with various leaders even distancing themselves and declaring independence days before the election.

The United Democratic Platform (PUD) fielded an unknown and elderly candidate whose only strength was based on a transfer of support from Maria Corina Machado.

Another significant fact is that the hegemonic sector of the opposition, represented by the PUD, had abstained from the polls in several recent processes, hindering the development of its electoral machinery and territorial and sectoral structures.

On the other hand, the organization Vente Venezuela, led by Maria Corina Machado, is not a formalized political party, had never participated in open elections, and therefore lacked a proven real machinery in a conventional presidential election. Opposition spokespeople have claimed that about 4.5 million Venezuelans registered in the electoral roll have left Venezuela and were unable to register to vote abroad.

According to the opposition, anti-Chavism is an overwhelming majority among those millions of voters, which means, according to their own analysis, that they have lost a voter base counted in millions.

Unlike the ConVzla Command’s handling of chavismo’s electoral history, the CNE data for the 2024 presidential elections does not deny the opposition’s electoral dimensions; on the contrary, it reaffirms them, as it places the trend of votes for Edmundo Gonzalez within the parameters outlined in the records.

An example of this would be that the votes obtained by Gonzalez indicate a loss of 2 million votes since the 2013 presidential election, confirming the claims made from within his own political camp, including those of Eugenio Martinez, who argue that a considerable part of their support base has emigrated.

Another example is that Edmundo Gonzalez would have obtained 2.4 million more votes than those secured by Henri Falcon and Javier Bertucci combined in 2018. This differential coincides with the statistics of an election partially boycotted by some political parties that called for abstention in 2018.

The abstention and emigration of a segment of the electorate would explain why the 2018 presidential election had the lowest turnout since 2006, with only 46% of the electoral roll turning out to vote.

From 2018 to 2024, the recovery of the opposition vote would have been significant. The 2024 result (according to CNE figures) almost doubles the 2018 vote count. This would be a reasonable margin.

The history of the successive opposition electoral umbrellas, according to legal figures, is graphically represented as follows:

The numbers from the Electoral Power indicate that the 2015 parliamentary elections, the 2013 presidential election, and the 2012 presidential election were the elections prior to 2024 where the opposition showed its best performance.

The 2024 presidential election, confirmed by the TSJ’s expert review, ranks fourth, placing it within the average range of votes achieved by the opposition in relevant elections.

The graph also indicates that, like Chavism, in presidential elections, the opposition’s supporters are more united and participate more than in other elections, with the 2015 parliamentary victory being particularly exceptional. In 2015, the opposition participated with a cohesive party structure, built an electoral machine, and capitalized on widespread economic discontent, promising voters a “last queue” (a promise they did not fulfill) in reference to the shortage of basic goods at the time.

The data within the dotted lines highlight that, according to the CNE, in 2024, the opposition achieved a significant recovery, making it a competitive force in a context where they managed to polarize the electorate despite having other candidates in the race, apart from the incumbent candidate.

However, the pattern of lost opposition votes is reaffirmed when viewed through the lens of the 2015 numbers, which could be explained, among several factors, by the migration issue already mentioned, which has also been noted by right-wing electoral analysts.

Electoral Dynamics: Chavism vs. Opposition, and Conclusions

The history of the two political poles indicates that their electorates participate similarly in each election, increasing their interest in presidential elections and reducing their participation in regional and municipal elections. In other words, the overall participation margin is the key factor that has decisively influenced these electoral dynamics.

There is a common factor in the elections where the opposition performed well: those with high overall participation. In 2012, it was 80%. In the 2013 presidential elections, it was 79%. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, it was 74%.

In competitive elections, within the framework of general public interest, voter turnout increases and benefits opposition parties since a number of abstainers, undecided voters, or politically unaffiliated individuals likely lean toward options opposing Chavism.

The dubious data published by the ConVzla Command in August 2024 suggest a complete break from all electoral parameters and history. Electoral participation was 59.9%, according to the CNE. The opposition, with its parallel electoral power, offers a similar percentage: 60% participation.

According to the discourse presented by the Gonzalez/Machado duo and their surroundings, this would be the first election on record where, with a medium level of electoral participation for a presidential election, the opposition wins overwhelmingly, with a 37% margin favoring Edmundo Gonzalez. This is technically delirious.

As we stated earlier, in electoral processes, almost anything is possible. But based on records and dynamics, the data promoted by ConVzla through the two portals would be highly unlikely, especially considering that for such a result to have occurred, more than half of the chavista electoral base, which is fully identified in lists of various structures and related mechanisms, would have had to participate in the election with the intent of voting for the opposition.

In any case, the usual behavior of discontented voters is to abstain, but the opposition suggests that they deliberately voted against Maduro. A 59% or 60% electoral participation suggests that about 7 out of 10 voters in Venezuela would have participated on July 28.

The figures released by the parallel portals indicate that the people included in the chavista voter lists, which could reach up to 6 million sympathizers and militants, not only participated in the election (they claim that 60% participated) but also did so to vote against Maduro.

As we have already explained, in Venezuela, the vote is secret, and there are no objective ways to verify this. Moreover, such an assessment is based solely on the unusual and unverifiable numbers presented by the Venezuelan opposition. According to this highly questionable data, the electoral history would graph as follows:

The unofficial data published by the opposition, corresponding to the July 28 election, propose the most atypical electoral behavior recorded in the timeline from 2006-2024. They describe the supposed most astonishing rebound in the country’s political history in two decades, but also the worst landslide for Chavism seen in the records.

There are no objective grounds to support a result of these characteristics. As we have already stated, only 30% of the supposed “election records” (assuming they are even verifiable) are on a website, which were not subjected to the expert review carried out by the Electoral Chamber of the TSJ, and which have already detected immense irregularities.

Meanwhile, the overall performance of Chavism and the combined oppositions, according to official data corresponding to July 28, can be graphically seen as follows:

The CNE’s information regarding 2024, on the other hand, frames the result within previous trends, in line with the historical behavior between Chavism and the opposition. The July 28 election was competitive and polarized, considering that part of the electorate is outside the country and was unable to change its status in the electoral registry to vote abroad.

With 59.9% participation from the electoral roll, Chavism materializes in votes the intention of its militants and sympathizers, estimated at over 6 million voters, according to various organizational registry sources, while the opposition rebounds to achieve a good crop of votes, framing it among its historical highs.

The official (and legal) numbers are a clear contrast to the data offered by the ConVzla Command, completely outside any electoral norm, which also contradict the very statements made by Machado/Gonzalez, etc., about the voters outside Venezuela.

It is necessary to emphasize how relevant the overall participation rate is and its impact on opposition support. Chavism is the electoral force with the least propensity to abstain; its base remains at constant levels, while the right only achieves good results when there is high electoral participation, as reflected in the electoral roll itself.

In the 2018 presidential elections, with a partial boycott and a portion of the electorate already emigrating, a 46% participation of the electoral roll was recorded. This is precisely the election where the opposition had its worst performance in presidential elections.

For mathematical reasons, this speaks to the extremely low possibility that the opposition could have outpaced Chavism by nearly 3 million votes and 37 percentage points in an election with medium participation, at 59.9%, as the CNE states and as the opposition confirms with a round 60% participation.

Venezuelan electoral history suggests that the determining and cross-cutting factor in electoral processes is the level of overall participation.

Considering that Venezuelan elections and the counting of voting intentions from militants and sympathizers are based on organizational structures, political machinery, and lists of co-opted voters, and this is proven to be the case for chavismo, it is unlikely that the Venezuelan opposition won by the margins they claim to have won. Participation would have had to be much higher, between 75% and 80%, for the opposition to achieve a comfortable percentage lead.

Finally, the logical treatment of the data and the notably recorded and demonstrated political trends of the Venezuelan right conclude that ConVzla almost certainly published inflated and false data, and that by doing so, they have elevated the sophistication of their methods—publishing data under the Sumate scheme (parallel institutionalization) and committing electoral crimes—to claim fraud, as they have done in almost all elections held since 2004.

Considering the scenario promoted by the opposition and foreign actors of delegitimization, attempts at institutional breakdown, street political violence, calls for the insubordination of Venezuelan military personnel, and foreign intervention, since July 28, a new escalation in the ongoing operation for regime change in the country has been developing in Venezuela.

Therefore, based on this analysis, it must be concluded that the figures released on parallel portals, without any verification, with manipulated information, are unrealistic and are, in themselves, an instrument of the broader operation to oust the government and the entirety of the country’s public powers.

The Supreme Justice Court’s Electoral Chamber ratified the results published by the CNE, which declared re-elected President Nicolas Maduro as the winner, and ordered the detailed publication of the electoral results from July 28, according to each polling station and electoral center.

teleSUR/ JF Source: Mision Verdad

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