ExxonMobil’s Protracted War Against Venezuela

ExxonMobil logo. X/ @perezneyfer05
By: Mision Verdad
March 12, 2025 Hour: 11:47 am
This chronology outlines the key milestones of ExxonMobil’s role in the transnational war against the Bolivarian nation.
This week, Delcy Rodriguez, the Venezuelan Vice President and Oil Minister, denounced ExxonMobil’s conspiratorial scheme to undermine Venezuela’s political and economic stability through the U.S. government via sanctions and geopolitical influence.
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Below, we present a chronology outlining the key milestones of ExxonMobil’s role in the transnational war against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, providing analytical and narrative details of the actions carried out by the U.S. corporation over two decades, with the Essequibo region as a determining factor in the past decade.
This chronology can serve as a reference for future research, including an in-depth analysis of the territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana, given the increasingly assertive role of the oil company in bilateral relations and the extractive dynamics of Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Company’s Origins
Formerly known as Standard Oil of New Jersey and owned by the Rockefeller family—whose subsidiary, Creole Petroleum Corporation, operated in Venezuela from 1921 to 1975—the American company Exxon acquired its rival Mobil in 1998, marking the largest corporate merger in history at the time. From then on, it became known as ExxonMobil, a company with operations in most Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Mobil Oil had been operating in Venezuela since 1997 after being awarded a contract by Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) during the Oil Opening, specifically for the Cerro Negro field, located in Monagas state, near the Orinoco Belt.
Following the merger, ExxonMobil took control of the Cerro Negro complex, holding a 41.7% stake alongside British company BP. The American oil company benefited from a royalty rate of only 1% during the project’s initial years of production, despite the operational contracts requiring a rate of 16.66%.
ExxonMobil also inherited Mobil Oil’s operations in La Ceiba, where it had been producing nearly 4,000 barrels per day alongside Canadian company Petro-Canada since 1996.
Lee Raymond, known as a staunch opponent of state participation in business, served as president and CEO of the U.S. multinational from 1999 to 2005. His successor, Rex Tillerson, took over the company, marking a turning point in its operations in Venezuela. Additionally, Tim Cutt, an American with a long managerial career at Mobil Oil, served as president of ExxonMobil’s operations in Venezuela starting in 2005.
The multinational had multiple interests in the country, including downstream service stations (refining, distribution, and petroleum sales) and supply agreements that directed Venezuelan crude oil to a large refinery in Chalmette, Louisiana, which ExxonMobil co-owned with PDVSA.
In 2005, the administration government of President Hugo Chavez and PDVSA began negotiations to transition the operating agreements of foreign companies engaged in oil activities in Venezuela into joint ventures, in accordance with the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law, which mandated that PDVSA hold at least 51% of the shares in such projects. Additionally, under the Income Tax Law, taxes for multinational corporations were set to increase from 34% to 50%.
On May 16, 2006, a legislative session in the National Assembly amended Decree No. 1,510 with the force of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law to modify Article 48, which was republished in the Official Gazette No. 37,323 on May 24, 2006.
With the republication of the Hydrocarbons Law, the Bolivarian government initiated the legal implementation of the aforementioned transition to joint ventures. A new era in Venezuela’s oil dynamics was about to begin.
2007: ExxonMobil Withdraws from Venezuela
During negotiations with President Chavez’s government, Tillerson and Cutt adopted a two-pronged approach: they negotiated to remain in Venezuela while, starting in April, they prepared for their departure from the country, setting June as the deadline to comply with Venezuelan legislation, in accordance with decisions made by the Executive Branch and the National Assembly.
After months of negotiations, ExxonMobil decided not to comply with the requirements imposed by the Organic Hydrocarbons Law. Tim Cutt informed the Bolivarian Government that the U.S. company would withdraw from the Cerro Negro project and intended to file lawsuits against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in international arbitration courts for damages.
ConocoPhillips, another major U.S. energy company, also decided to leave, refusing to accept the conditions that Venezuelan laws established for contractual operations with transnational corporations in the oil and gas sector.
On June 26, the shares of both transnational oil companies in the projects were reverted to PDVSA and reassigned to other subsidiaries of the Venezuelan state-owned company under the structure of joint ventures. However, the company led by Tillerson decided to work with the Venezuelan state to settle outstanding bond debts owed to international financiers who had invested in Cerro Grande.
While both parties were managing their payment obligations, ExxonMobil hired attorney Steven K. Davidson from the Washington, D.C.-based law firm Steptoe & Johnson to litigate against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in U.S. courts and thus seek “revenge” in the form of dollars for its departure from the country, which, according to the company’s calculations, resulted in losses exceeding US$19 billion.
On Dec. 27, the Steptoe attorney requested an emergency hearing before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to freeze and seize PDVSA’s assets in the United States, specifically the so-called Project Accounts at the Bank of New York (joint accounts between ExxonMobil and PDVSA where foreign currency earnings from Cerro Negro operations were deposited), estimated at US$300 million (which, by law, belonged to Venezuela).
Judge Kevin Castel approved and granted the request, agreeing to keep the matter confidential at ExxonMobil’s request until the seizure was effectively carried out. ExxonMobil intended to retain these funds through international arbitration.
2008. Procedural Fraud in U.S. Courts and International Arbitrations
The company attempted to freeze PDVSA’s assets worldwide through the High Court of Justice in London in January 2008 but failed. However, the freezing of PDVSA’s US$300 million in the Bank of New York accounts was confirmed on February 13 by U.S. District Judge Deborah Batts in a Manhattan federal court.
The justification for seizing these liquid assets was based on ExxonMobil’s claim that it sought compensation for its exit following the migration of foreign oil companies’ operational agreements into joint ventures. According to the arguments presented by the company’s attorneys, “there was a probability or a possibility” that the Venezuelan state would not pay whatever amount was determined by international arbitration, and therefore, freezing the funds would “guarantee that PDVSA fulfilled its obligations.” However, at that point, there was no financial obligation to fulfill.
For the Venezuelan state-owned company to recover its funds, it would have to seek them through ExxonMobil’s preferred arbitration tribunal, the U.S. judge ruled. Thus, the litigation proceeded before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World Bank, headquartered in Washington, D.C.
Three arbitrators were appointed: two chosen by ExxonMobil (a Swiss and a French arbitrator, the latter serving as the case’s president) and one by PDVSA (an Egyptian arbitrator). The first session was held on November 7 at the World Bank Conference Center in Paris, France. Additionally, in February, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit against Venezuela for breach of contract before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), also headquartered in Paris, France.
2009-2014: Rulings, Reviews, and Appeals
From Sep. 2009 to June 2010, Venezuela appealed to ICSID regarding its jurisdictional objections due to ExxonMobil’s judicial abuses. The tribunal decided to bifurcate the process into multiple parts. As a result, deliberations were delayed due to Venezuela’s constant appeals against the corporate party’s compensation claims.
Meanwhile, on January 2, 2012, PDVSA announced that, following the ICC ruling, it would pay US$255 million to ExxonMobil, despite the transnational company demanding US$12 billion plus interest. Originally, the payment was set at US$908 million but was reduced to US$255 million after the following deductions:
– ExxonMobil owed PDVSA US$191 million for payments the state company had made for project development in Cerro Negro.
– The US$300 million frozen in the Bank of New York accounts in December 2007.
– US$160 million in counterclaims.
This was a resounding victory for Venezuela against the corporation’s “completely exaggerated and illogical” demands, according to the Venezuelan state company’s statement.
On October 9, 2014, ICSID issued an award ordering PDVSA to pay ExxonMobil US$1.6 billion. Venezuela legally objected to this decision, requesting a suspension of payment and partial annulment of the ruling.
2015. ExxonMobil’s Illegal Entry into the Essequibo Region
On March 3, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry declared:
“The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela deplores the reaction of the government of Guyana to Venezuela’s claim regarding the unilateral action taken by the company ExxonMobil and its subsidiary, Esso Exploration and Production Guyana Limited, which has begun exploratory activities in the area known by Guyana as the ‘Stabroek Block’ without prior notification to the Venezuelan government. This is particularly concerning as the specific area of operations in the ‘Stabroek Block’ is located in an undelimited maritime zone that falls within Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty claim under the Geneva Agreement.”
The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry made this statement in response to the Guyanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had issued a communique on February 28, alleging that Venezuela was “obstructing the development of Guyana and its people, in violation of international law.” This statement contradicted the climate of cordiality and cooperation established during President Chavez’s administration and continued under President Nicolas Maduro. Consequently, the Foreign Ministry emphasized “the need to deepen bilateral cooperation as an essential mechanism to facilitate the resolution of the dispute inherited from British colonialism.”
On March 5, ExxonMobil began operations in undelimited territorial waters claimed by Venezuela in the Essequibo region. On March 8, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13692, establishing the legal, political, and administrative framework for imposing unilateral coercive measures (UCMs) against Venezuela.
The U.S. oil company made its first oil discovery in the “Stabroek Block”—which spans 26,800 square kilometers—offshore on May 20, specifically in the Liza-1 well, which at the time was estimated to contain 1.4 billion barrels of high-quality oil.
Through its exploration and exploitation of oil deposits in the “Stabroek Block,” ExxonMobil initiated a process of plundering Venezuela’s resources in territorial waters belonging to the Essequibo region. The boundaries of this region remain undelimited, yet ExxonMobil acted with the approval of successive Guyanese governments led by David Granger and Irfaan Ali.
2016-2024. ExxonMobil’s Interests Prevail Over the Essequibo Territorial Dispute
At the end of 2017, a major scandal erupted regarding the oil contract signed between ExxonMobil and the then-government of Guyana, following political and social pressure to disclose its details. The contractual document had been signed confidentially in 2016.
The U.S. company enjoys a 2% royalty rate for the “Stabroek Block,” which it leads. Additionally, the Guyanese state holds only a 14.5% stake in production, with plans to increase it to 27.5%. However, the multinational corporation refuses to renegotiate the contract terms.
Contractually, ExxonMobil holds the upper hand in profit distribution. The London-based organization Global Witness reported in 2020 that Guyana was losing out on $55 billion. By 2022, ExxonMobil’s reported earnings reached $577 billion.
Since 2015, the American multinational has continued discovering new offshore oil fields in the “Stabroek Block” in the Essequibo maritime region, totaling 46 finds with more than 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil and gas.
Control over energy resources in the Essequibo region is a strategic matter for ExxonMobil. For this reason, since 2017, it has financed Guyana’s legal teams in their lawsuit against Venezuela before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an attempt to formally validate the fraudulent 1899 Arbitral Award.
At the same time, the multinational company has lost ground in international arbitration. On March 9, 2017, a new ICSID arbitration panel confirmed that the previous tribunal had “clearly exceeded its authority and failed to provide a reasoned basis for asserting jurisdiction under the Dutch Treaty,” referring to the Bilateral Investment Treaty. As a result, the payment ordered in the 2014 award was annulled. However, on July 10, 2023, a new ICSID tribunal ruled that Venezuela must pay ExxonMobil US$77 million.
In this context, Rex Tillerson stepped down from his senior positions at ExxonMobil on January 12, 2017, to join the Trump administration as Secretary of State. This move directly intertwined the United States’ most important energy sector with the leadership of the White House’s diplomacy at a time when ExxonMobil’s oil exploration and exploitation were at their peak.
Under Tillerson’s leadership at the State Department, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13808 on August 24, 2017. This order imposed measures against PDVSA and the Bolivarian government, initiating a financial and legal blockade to prevent transactions related to financing, debt, capital, dividend payments, and direct or indirect purchases.
With Tillerson at the helm of U.S. diplomacy, the White House’s rhetoric against Venezuela intensified. His successor, Mike Pompeo, continued in the same vein, supporting Guyana and ExxonMobil’s activities in the maritime territory of the Essequibo region, in violation of Public International Law.
Amid this scenario, the U.S. company continues with its plans to control Essequibo’s resources through concessions while simultaneously claiming compensation through international arbitration. It also maneuvers to ensure that the ICJ rules in favor of Guyana against Venezuela, all with the backing of the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Defense (Southern Command).
2025. The Corporate Conspiracy Continues
A series of events in March may shed light on ExxonMobil’s latest behind-the-scenes maneuvering, influencing both the United States’ sanctions decisions—under Donald Trump’s second administration—and Guyana’s international actions.
– March 3: Venezuela publicly rejected Guyana’s accusations of an alleged “incursion” by a Venezuelan naval vessel into the waters of the Essequibo region. Guyanese President Irfaan Ali accused a Venezuelan naval patrol of approaching an oil facility linked to ExxonMobil’s offshore drilling operations in the disputed area.
– March 4: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) revoked General License 41, issued by the Biden administration in November 2022, which had allowed Chevron to resume crude oil production in Venezuela. The U.S. Treasury Department gave Chevron 30 days to cease all operations in the country.
– March 6: Guyana requested an order from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to stop Venezuela’s plans to elect a governor for the Essequibo region on May 25. In 2024, Venezuelan authorities approved a law establishing a new 24th state, Guayana Esequiba, based on the results of the consultative referendum held on December 3, 2023.
– March 10: during a press conference, Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, denounced a conspiracy in which ExxonMobil played a central role in actions harmful to Venezuela. She presented a document titled “Sanctions on Venezuela’s Oil: Less Money Means Less Power”, signed by:
– Juan Zarate, former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor (2005-2009), known as the “Sanctions Czar”;
– Peter Williams, military contractor and Senior Vice President of Global Operations at ExxonMobil;
– David Scott Scheer, military contractor for Northrop Grumman and financier of the current U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.
Rodriguez alleged that ExxonMobil lobbied the Trump administration—through the Treasury Department—to revoke Chevron’s license, forcing the company to halt its operations in Venezuela.
During the same address, she cited the book From Destiny to Prosperity (2023) by former Guyanese Minister of Natural Resources Raphael Trotman, in which he admits that ExxonMobil paid US$18 million to the Guyanese government to finance lawyers and lobby the ICJ against Venezuela. This, Rodriguez argued, violated the Geneva Agreement and international law in an attempt to illegally exploit Venezuelan resources in the Essequibo region. The high-ranking Venezuelan official stated:
“ExxonMobil has been conspiring against Venezuela for more than a decade, aiming to undermine its territorial integrity, steal its resources, cause internal political destabilization, promote a criminal economic blockade, and assassinate its leaders. I responsibly denounce that if anything happens to any high-ranking official of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, I hold ExxonMobil directly responsible.”
That same day, during his program “With Maduro +”, President Nicolas Maduro declared: “ExxonMobil moved a lot of money to try to destabilize Venezuela on July 28, 29, and 30,” adding that the corporation is “an enemy of the Venezuelan people and their right to happiness.”
Autor: Mision Verdad
Fuente: Mision Verdad
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