The expected ceasefire between the government and the ELN was not damaged because of the acceptance of an alleged protocol requested by the U.N. (which is not real) but was in fact sabotaged when the military refused to be examined by the Verification Mechanism. I will explain my opinion in 10 points. 

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One, the country is still being lied to because there is no such requirement from the U.N. since Jean Arnault attended Havana only as an observer and not to impose anything. It seems that the same mistake from the past continues to be made: the President did not receive complete information on the status of the negotiations. That is the reason why it is urgent that, as in the case of the FARC, there is a direct channel between [ELN Commander] Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista and the President of Colombia.

Two, the important effort made during the past bilateral ceasefire, that happened between October 2017 and January 2018, was not taken into account. On that occasion, a Verification Mechanism was designed that, unfortunately, was not implemented correctly. Last December, the debate was focused on whether the National Force could be examined by the Mechanism as the ELN intended, or if only the actions of the insurgency were to be evaluated as the state intended. The bilateral aspect of a ceasefire does not depend on how it is named but on how it is implemented. Nothing was learned from the experience of the FARC and government ceasefire.

Three, it seems like the most conservative sector of the military is no longer seeing Santos as the President, but is anxiously waiting for the return of Uribism. This shows two problems. On the one hand, that the peace policy did not manage to be a State policy and was reduced to a Government one. And on the other hand, that the delegation, like the rest of the government, entered into an unproductive interim phase.

Four, it seems that the government insists on tactical gains, to make a strategic defeat for peace. I mean: the government insists on a guerrilla surrender model (the tactical) without wanting to face the true objective of a peace construction beyond the end of political violence (the strategic).

Five, the waste of time has been mainly the government's fault, more than 15 months passed in the preliminary phase, 11 months between the announcement of the Agenda and the installation of the dialogue tables,  because there was not a single joint document on essential issues during 2017. As you can see, there was no respect for time and now they want to recover such waste in a week.

Six, as in the whole history of the ELN, and there would be many cases to illustrate this point, media continues to build a narrative that is neither responsible nor objective. It is very difficult for any government to defend a peace process when the enemy appears in the media from a wrong perspective. Society must know the negotiating parties in their reality and not in the interpretations of a third actor.

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Seven, despite the voices of the radical Uribism that demand the breaking of the dialogue tables immediately or who aspire to impose a new scenario (concentration of the ELN under international supervision and cessation of all of its activities), there are other voices that reflexively propose keeping the negotiation by looking for a new dynamic. The advantage of negotiating with Duque is that, theoretically, there would be no enemies of that peace. In any case, it is better to negotiate with a government that begins than with a government that ends.

Eight, the international community will not easily let a peace that has cost so much effort to be destroyed. The integral text of the agreement with the FARC is part of a resolution from the U.N. Security Council. In addition, the effort of all the countries that have accompanied the negotiations has an important weight. To this is added, the statements of the IMF supporting peace. It seems that peace in Colombia owes more to the international community than to the society that voted for the continuation of Uribism.

Nine, the opposite of a surrender is a negotiation and in it, by definition, the two parties gain something and lose something. In a well-designed peace, even if it hurts the Uribism, the ELN gains something, which would be precisely the strength accumulated to jump to the stage of legal politics. But I am not advocating for a peace where the ELN wins, but for a process where the country gains more than just taking violence out of politics, although this would be a great step.

Ten, all of the above is crossed by a fundamental error: They persist on negotiating with the ELN using what the elites dream of and what the enologists (the so-called experts in the ELN) imagine. The ELN of today is not the same as the one in the 70s, its assembly is non-negotiable nor its existing unity. The ELN Delegation receives orders from the Central Command and not the other way around as some claim. If Duque decides to continue the dialogue and really wants to sign a peace agreement, he must then be aware that he will sit down with a real ELN that has not yet given up the armed struggle and who is not defeated, but who does have a real will to take up political arms.